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The source of the shift in strategy
The SMD inherited the area, with no substantial 
change, from the North Caucasus Military District, 
which existed from 1918 until 2010. The only 
change to this area was the addition of Crimea, 
which was occupied in 2014. It also inherited the 
same structure, until the conflict with Ukraine 
broke out. Compared to the other military districts 
of the Russian army (the Western, Central and 
Eastern Districts), formed when parts of the ad-
ministrative military units that used to exist were 
merged or divided up, this is a major event and 
demonstrates the importance that the command 
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
continually attached to the southern strategic 
direction. The North Caucasus Military District was 
one of the most powerful military districts when 
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A shift in focus in Russia’s Southern Military District
Andrzej Wilk
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Military District (SMD), which is the smallest of 
all the main administrative units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in terms of landmass, 
has been one of the most powerful districts and one of those playing the greatest roles in the armed 
conflicts in which Russia is engaged. In the two Chechen wars and the strike against Georgia in 2008, 
it bore the main brunt, and at present currently, along with the Black Sea Fleet (which is under its 
command), it bears the main responsibility for operations against Ukraine and for the military opera-
tion in Syria.
Until the mid-2010s, the natural theatre for operations and area of SMD military activity was: the 
Caucasus, Turkey, the Middle East, and Iran. The conflict with Ukraine caused the SMD’s centre of grav-
ity to shift to regions directly bordering Ukraine and occupied Crimea. The changes to the structure 
and the twofold increase in the SMD’s capability observed since that time show that the southern 
direction is no longer a priority. Examples of this increase include: the forming of the new 8th Army 
(A) on the Ukraine border and expansion of the group in Crimea, The vast majority of SMD units are 
currently preparing for operations in the western direction. Ukraine has become the main target, but 
if a conflict should break out on NATO’s eastern flank, the SMD’s task would be to provide direct 
support for operations in Central Europe.
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there were six military districts in Russia, while 
the Southern Military District remained strong 
when the number was reduced to four.
The SMD continued to be of major importance 
chiefly due to a change made in 2010 to the com-
mand system of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation, when the military district command 
was restructured as a joint strategic command 
due to it being put in charge of all of the service 
branches based in the district (except the strategic 
nuclear forces). As a result of this process, the 
capability of the North Caucasus Military District1 
at the time the SMD (the Southern Joint Strategic 
Command) was formed was enlarged to include 
the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and Caspian Flotilla (CFL). 
This makes the SMD, presently and in the foresee-
able future, the only military district in charge of 
two Russian Federation Navy operational groups.2
Originally, the forming of the SMD did not lead 
to any changes to the direction and area of op-
erations or plans to enhance its capability other 
than it becoming more professional and receiving 
a technical upgrading. The current operational 
formations (armies) and military bases (equivalents 
of mechanised brigades) under the district’s com-
mand in Armenia and in the occupied territories 
in Georgia (within the ‘republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia’) led to the creation of a group suffi-
cient to monitor the military situation and respond 
directly should the situation take a turn unfavour-
able for Russia south of the Caucasus massif.
1 The core was the 49th and 58th Army and 4th Air and Air 
Defence Forces Army.
2 Originally, the Western Military District was in a comparable 
situation, in command of the Baltic and Northern Fleet, 
but in 2015 the Joint Strategic Command ‘North’ (Arctic) 
was formed using the Northern Fleet and, from 2021, the 
Northern (Arctic) Military District will be created from the 
northern part of the Western Military District and islands on 
the Arctic Ocean which were previously part of the Central 
and Eastern Military Districts.
The enhancing of capability in the European di-
rection, ongoing since 2013, originally only con-
cerned the Western Military District. The SMD was 
included in this process due to the turn taken in 
the military situation in Donbas in August 2014, 
where Russia caused a direct armed confrontation 
with the Ukrainian army. The operation to cause 
the breakaway of Ukraine’s southern and eastern 
districts (referred to in Russian propaganda as 
‘Little Russia’) by creating and supporting sepa-
ratist movements, the attaining of proficiency 
by Ukraine’s armed forces, and the forming of 
entrenched frontline positions in Donbas ended 
in failure. This led to part of the command realis-
ing that if a full-scale armed conflict broke out, 
a permanent and strong group would need to be 
maintained in the border regions.
Expanding the group in the direction 
of Ukraine
Russia began increasing its military presence in 
Ukraine’s occupied territories – Crimea and part 
of Donbas (officially under the administration of 
separatists from the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk Peo-
ple’s Republics’) – immediately upon taking over 
the territories. Up until September 2014, which 
saw the first in a long line of ceasefires, the re-
inforcement of Russia’s military presence on the 
Crimean Peninsula and in the eastern districts of 
Ukraine was not permanent and was solely re-
lated to the possible escalation of military action, 
including to the level of a regular war between 
Russia and Ukraine. Not only SMD units, but also 
subunits (such as the ‘little green men’) from the 
other military districts took part in the operation.
As early as autumn 2014, any measures to main-
tain a Russian military presence and expand the 
military capability in the occupied areas were put 
under SMD command. At the same time, the group 
created in Crimea came under the charge of the 
BSF (which was under SMD command) and this 
was in the occupied part of Donbas, the ‘Donetsk 
and Luhansk People’s Republics’. This paper will 
not deal with the subject of armed formations 
The expansion of the capability of the 
SMD was due to the Russian army’s 
engagement in Ukraine.
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of separatists,3 but it needs to be borne in mind 
that since they came into existence they have 
been operational structures under SMD com-
mand (the district command is located in nearby 
Rostov-on-Don), and the SMD is the natural and 
sole supporting force for them.4
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the core 
of the Russian BSF has been continually stationed 
in Crimea, while the land and air components of 
the fleet, concentrated in the vicinity of Sevas-
topol, have been relatively few in number. They 
were mostly formed from independent subunits 
in service branches, and the only tactical forma-
tion was the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. While 
the importance of the peninsular for the marine 
component of the BSF remained unchanged from 
2014 onwards, the increase of land and air capa-
bility observed since it was annexed by Russia 
has probably exceeded the levels of Soviet times.
Before the collapse of the USSR, the role of the 
group in Crimea was confined solely to shield-
ing the BSF. Today, on the other hand, it is also 
responsible for organising auxiliary operations in 
the armed conflict with Ukraine (including expan-
sion of the offensive on the coastal belt). This is 
demonstrated by the forming of the 22nd Army 
Corps in February 2017. This is made up exclusively 
of new units (i.e. ones formed since 2014), led by 
the 126th Coastal Defence Mechanised Brigade. 
It does not include units directly responsible for 
shielding and supporting the Sevastopol base 
and marine component of the BSF (this part of 
the group has also been considerably enlarged).
The organising and development of the military 
capability in occupied Crimea was the first change 
3 Primarily due to the organisational and technical differ-
ences between Russia maintained between those and the 
regular formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation, and not administrative matters. In the ‘Donetsk 
and Luhansk People’s Militias’ – despite being reinforced 
by Russian army personnel and replenished from Russian 
stores – a pretence of them being separate is maintained, 
mainly with regard to equipment (which incidentally makes 
armed provocation by separatists easier).
4 The relationship between the SMD and armed separatist 
formations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is comparable, 
while regular SMD units are also stationed in those republics.
that followed the shift in the strategic focus of 
the SMD, but it was not the largest or the most 
significant. The forming, largely from scratch, of 
the 8th A, which is the largest operational forma-
tion in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion created in recent years, was unprecedented 
in terms of the entire Russian army. The core of 
the unit is the 150th Mechanised Division – one 
of the first two tactical formations formed in 
Russia since Soviet times in a wartime structure 
from the outset,5 meaning it was formed with 
four all-military full-time regiments. In addition, 
this division has two tank regiments and is cur-
rently the heaviest mechanised division in the 
Russian army. Together with the other tactical 
formations and independent units and subunits, 
at the level of the army, the 8th A soon became 
the SMD operational formation with the second 
largest capability, only slightly behind the 58th A.
To become operationally capable as soon as pos-
sible, the 8th A was initially formed at the expense 
of the 49th A, which had primary responsibility for 
operations in the Caucasus. Among others, two 
out of four mechanised brigades were moved from 
the 49th A to the 8th Army.6 In the meantime, the 
8th A was reinforced by an artillery brigade, which 
this operational formation was lacking. As a re-
sult of the transformation, the 49th A became, 
in relative terms, the weakest of the three SMD 
combined arms armies. Although, in the long term, 
expansion of its structures cannot be ruled out, 
the changes observed confirm the theory that the 
southern direction is no longer a priority in the 
operational plans of the SMD, while the centre of 
gravity of the whole strategic direction – which, 
5 Including the Central Military District 90th Armoured Divi- 
sion – both units were created on 1 December 2016. 
At the moment all of the Russian divisions, previously ex-
isting and newly formed, have adopted a wartime structure, 
i.e. four regiments.
6 The 33rd Mechanised Brigade, one of two brigades in the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation specially trained 
to operate in mountainous terrain, was the basis for the 
150th Mechanised Division.
The formation of the 8th Army is 
a move that is unprecedented in 
terms of the entire Russian army.
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in name, continues to be towards the south – has 
shifted westwards. This is demonstrated not only 
by the way in which the 8th Army was formed, 
but also by changes occurring in the third SMD 
operational formation – the 58th A – to adapt it 
to conduct operations as a second force in the 
direction of Ukraine.7
Although, since 2015, the main task of the BSF 
has been to provide support for the Russian con-
tingent in Syria, changes to the fleet’s marine 
component are another element indicating prepa-
rations for operations in Europe. Over the last five 
years, the number of BSF battleships has doubled, 
and the number of submarines has risen sixfold 
(originally there was one), while all of the frigates, 
missile corvettes and submarines put into service 
are platforms for Kalibr cruise missiles. This means 
that their main task in the event of a conflict in 
the Black Sea region will be direct support of air 
and land operations (not only Ukraine and NATO’s 
Black Sea countries, but the whole of Central Eu-
rope is within the range of Kalibr missiles). Prior 
to 2014, the BSF did not have this capability at all.
The Southern Military District, 2020
The expansion of structures as described above 
and the formation of new SMD units, alongside 
the fact that personnel are now professional and 
the technical upgrades, means that the capability 
of the SMD has probably at least doubled over 
the last six years (see appendix for a detailed 
comparison). The district now has four all-military 
operational formations – three armies and one 
army corps, as well as one Air and Air Defence 
7 The mass equipping of the 150th Mechanised Division 
with the latest mass-produced infantry combat vehicle – 
the BMP-3 – was a technical indication of the SMD’s prepa-
rations for operations in the conditions of the Great Euro-
pean Plain. This is the main infantry combat vehicle in the 
8th A and 58th A, and the SMD uses the highest number 
of vehicles of this kind in the Russian army (480 or more 
in number).
Forces army, and a fleet and independent flotilla 
in the Navy. Compared to the first half of this 
decade, the number of troops has increased in 
peacetime from 70,000 to more than 100,000 
(not including crews of ships in the BSF and CFL).8 
However, a simple quantitative comparison does 
not reflect the extent to which the offensive ca-
pability of the group of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation has increased in the strategic 
direction that is still nominally directed towards 
the south. In linear units there are almost 800 
tanks, more than 2,500 armoured combat vehicles, 
more than 2,000 100 mm and higher calibre artil-
lery pieces, 240 combat aircraft, and 130 combat 
and combat support helicopters.9
The BSF and CFL jointly have more than 70 ships 
(not including auxiliary units) and six submarines 
(all in the BSF).10 Units are being equipped with 
new arms or thoroughly upgraded arms and mili-
tary equipment at a level of between 70% (the 
envisaged level under the State Armament Pro-
gramme for 2011–2020) and 100% (for example 
in the case of missile brigades equipped with 
Iskander systems and the submarine brigade).11
In terms of the number of professional person-
nel and the level of training activity, the SMD 
does not differ from the other military districts.12 
It does, though, have one specific characteristic: 
the relatively high portion of exercises conducted 
on training grounds in mountainous terrain. How-
ever, due to the change in strategic focus described 
above, these are no longer the principal form of 
training in training programmes. The SMD has, 
though, become the leader in organising joint 
exercises involving land, sea and air formations, 
8 Author’s estimates based on the number and structure 
of units.
9 Author’s calculations based on Южный военный округ 
(www.milkavkaz.com) and Russian Federation Ministry of 
Defence and press agencies (TASS, Interfax) data.
10 Author’s calculations based on www.milkavkaz.com –  
Черноморский флот РФ, Каспийская флотилия РФ – and 
Russian Federation Ministry of Defence and press agencies 
(TASS, Interfax) data.
11 ‘Поступление современной техники в войска ЮВО’, 
Красная звезда, 25 May 2020, redstar.ru, et al.
12 20% are conscripted, which is just over 1 million troops 
in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and this is 
comparable to all of the military districts.
The offensive capability of the SMD 
at least doubled over the course of 
six years.
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while the vast majority of these exercises are 
held in the Black Sea basin and Black Sea regions 
(mainly Crimea and Kuban).
In addition to completing the formation of new 
units and expanding the existing units to wartime 
levels (mainly the 8th A), it has been announced 
that two more divisions will be created, neither of 
which will be assigned for operations in the Cau-
casus. Expansion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade 
to the level of a division, from the 58th A, is already 
in progress and all that remains is for it to be of-
ficially confirmed that the 19th Mechanised Divi-
sion has been reconstructed.13 Forming another 
division, probably based on the 20th Mechanised 
Brigade in the 8th Army,14 should begin no later 
than by 2021. The new tactical formations should 
be considered an addition to make up the first- 
and second-force SMD army to a level giving it 
superiority over the Ukrainian army, enabling it to 
prepare and conduct military operations against 
Ukraine relatively independently.
13 Г. Дзапаров, ‘Во Владикавказе прошла первая репетиция 
парада Победы’, Iryston.tv, 17 June 2020, www.iryston.tv.
14 И. Сафронов, А. Никольский, ‘Новая мотострелковая 
дивизия укрепит группировку на границе с Украиной’, 
Ведомости, 22 March 2020, www.vedomosti.ru. Accord-
ing to some sources, expansion of the division based on 
the 136th Mechanised Brigade is also being considered, but 
this is doubtful due to the base’s location (Dagestan) and 
the fact that the unit was formed as a brigade from the 
outset, even in the times of the USSR. The 19th and 20th 
Mechanised Brigades were created based on the reduced 
divisions of the same names.
Conclusions
Over a period of six years, the centre of gravity 
of the SMD has shifted from the Caucasus to 
regions directly bordering Ukraine and occupied 
Crimea. The district has not lost its traditional role 
of a group ready to conduct operations in the 
Southern Caucasus, but the direction in which its 
capability is being expanded demonstrates that 
this is no longer considered a priority. The prin-
cipal operational direction for the (nominally) 
Southern Military District is now the western 
direction. The announced further expansion of 
SMD forces will be the foundation for the shift 
in the SMD’s strategic focus.
Training endeavours, starting with the Caucasus 
2016 command-and-staff strategic exercises, are 
a clear indication that the main target of SMD 
forces, and their adversary, is Ukraine. In 2016, the 
district did not yet have the capability, if needed, 
to conduct a military operation against Ukraine 
because the formation of the 8th A and 22nd Army 
Corps had only just begun. Although the restruc-
turing of the SMD, especially the formation of two 
new divisions, will take a minimum of two years to 
complete, the Caucasus 2020 command-and-staff 
strategic exercises scheduled for September 2020 
will be its first real test. The codename ‘endeav-
our’ can currently be interpreted at best as a sign 
of attachment to tradition because, regardless 
of which training ground SMD units enter dur-
ing the exercises, and how official statements 
are worded, the staffs’ main objective will be 
to simulate a military operation against Ukraine, 
and the troops’ main objective will be to simulate 
a confrontation with the Ukrainian army. 
The exercises show that the Ukrain-
ian army is the SMD’s principal 
adversary.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Changes in the numbers of operational and tactical formations of Land Forces, Air-
borne Forces, and Naval Land and Coastal Forces (all-military forces and support) under SMD 
command in 2014–2020 (as at the beginning of the year)
2014 
(including 
in the Ukraine direction)
2020 
(including 
in the Ukraine direction)
Comments
Operational formations
Combined arms army 2 (0) 3 (1)
Army corps 0 1 (1)
Tactical formations
Mechanised division 0 2 (1) Formation of the 19th 
Mechanised Division 
began in 2020
Air Assault division 1 1
Mechanised division 11 9 (2) Three brigades were used 
as the basis for expand-
ing the 42nd and 150th 
Mechanised Divisions
Marine brigade 1 (1) 1 (1)
Air Assault brigade 1 1
Spetsnaz brigade 3 3 (1)
Artillery brigade 1 2
Missile artillery brigade 1 1
Missile brigade 2 3 (1)





1 2 (1) The tactical formation ex-
isting in 2014 was a com-
bined artillery and missile 
brigade














Air defence (missile) 
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Table 2. Changes in the numbers of operational and tactical formations of Aerospace Forces 
and of Naval Aviation under SMD command in 2014–2020 (as at the beginning of the year)
2014 2020 Comments
Operational formations




Air division 2 3
Air defence division 1 2
Army air division 0 1
Air combat regiment 5 9 Within a division 
or independent
Helicopter regiment 2 3 Within a division 
or independent
Missile regiment 3 5 Within a division
Table 3. Changes in the numbers of surface combatants and submarines under SMD command 





Missile corvette 2 7 Another 11 under 
construction




Missile corvette 1 4
